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 Non-technical Summary 
International knowledge spillovers through multinational companies (MNC) and their 
international subsidiaries have recently been a major topic of academic and management 
discussion. However, MNC are mainly treated as relatively passive actors without clear 
knowledge protection strategies. We expand this stream of research by explicitly investigating 
how MNC subsidiaries actively protect their knowledge by using legal as well as market-
based knowledge protection instruments. Whereas existing studies usually solely rely on legal 
knowledge protection instruments (patents, copyrights, trademarks) as indicators of 
knowledge protection, we additionally include market-based ones (secrecy, lead time, 
complex design), which are barely examined in existing literature. We argue that the choice 
and intensity of knowledge protection strategies is influenced by the technological 
development of the host country. Host country technological development is measured along 
two dimensions: geographical location and industry strength. 
An empirical investigation of more than 1,500 German firms reveals that both dimensions 
provide important contingencies to MNC subsidiary managers. They differ, however, with 
regards to the type of knowledge protection. Legal forms are used more restrictively if the 
geographical subsidiary environment in the host country is technologically leading. We 
suspect that this is due to the fact that the dangers for knowledge outflows through personnel 
turnover are especially pressing in highly developed areas, as skilled employees have multiple 
employment opportunities without major distractions to their personal life. Market-based 
strategies, though, are used substantially less restrictively when the host country is a 
technological leader in the respective MNC industry. Demonstrated reciprocity in knowledge 
exchanges is apparently especially rewarding with technologically leading host country 
counterparts. Overly restrictive market-based protection strategies (e.g. through secrecy) may 
damage these relationships as they are designed to provide no signals to potential 
counterparts. In contrast, legal protection strategies imply a formal application process 
providing foreign MNC subsidiaries with tangible signals of their research activities for 
potential partners. 
From a management perspective our results indicate that MNC subsidiaries need to develop 
knowledge protection strategies that go beyond patenting. Knowledge protection strategies 
have to reflect host country contingencies along two major dimensions: industry and 
geography. MNC subsidiaries require formal knowledge protection capabilities when they 
engage in geographically leading host country regions. Conversely, the budgets for 
developing and maintaining these capabilities can be limited in host country states or districts 
with lagging status. Technological opportunities for sourcing knowledge from host country 
competitors in the same industry require reciprocity with regards to market-based protection 
strategies. Hence, MNC subsidiary management should be prepared to actively engage in host 
country knowledge sharing once opportunities arise. In lagging host country industry 
environments, though, they should increase the restrictiveness these protection mechanisms. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Internationaler Wissenstransfer durch multinationale Unternehmen (MNU) und ihre 
internationalen Niederlassungen hat besondere Aufmerksamkeit im aktuellen akademischen 
und praxeologischen Diskurs gefunden. Obwohl die Rolle von MNU als Multiplikator in 
Wissenstransferprozessen ausgiebig erforscht ist, existieren kaum Befunde darüber, wie MNU 
aktiv den Abfluss von Wissen im Ausland zu verhindern versuchen. MNU werden häufig als 
eher passive Akteure ohne klare Wissensschutzstrategie betrachtet. Die vorliegende Analyse 
knüpft an bestehenden Befunden an und erweitern diese durch die Untersuchung des 
Einsatzes legaler (z.B. Patentierung) und marktbasierter Schutzstrategien (z.B. 
Geheimhaltung) von MNU-Managern. Während im bisherigen Studien hauptsächlich so 
genannte legale Schutzinstrumente berücksichtigt werden, welche meistens durch Patente als 
alleinigen Indikator operationalisiert werden, untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit zusätzlich den 
Einsatz markt-basierter Instrumente, die in bisheriger Forschung kaum explizite Betrachtung 
gefunden haben. Hypothesen über die Wahl und Einsatzintensität der legalen und markt-
basierten Schutzstrategien der MNU in Abhängigkeit der technologischen Führerschaft ihres 
externen Standortes werden in dieser Studie entwickelt. Dabei wird auf der einen Seite die 
technologische Führerschaft des geographischen Standortes und auf der anderen Seite 
diejenige der operierenden Branche der MNU berücksichtigt. 
Eine empirische Analyse an einer aus mehr als 1500 deutschen Firmen bestehenden 
Stichprobe unterstützt die Hypothesen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen Unterschiede zwischen den 
inländischen Unternehmen und MNU hinsichtlich der eingesetzten Wissensschutzstrategien. 
MNU setzen legale Wissensschutzinstrumente häufiger ein, wenn die geographische 
Landschaft des externen Standortes den Status eines Technologieführers hat. In solchen 
Fällen ergeben sich vielfältige Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten für kompetente Mitarbeiter, 
welche wertvolles Wissen zu potenziellen Wettbewerbern transferieren können. Im Gegensatz 
hierzu werden markt-basierte Strategien weniger restriktiv eingesetzt, wenn der externe 
Standort eine technologische Führerschaft hinsichtlich der Branche, in der das MNU aktiv ist, 
aufweist. Signalisierte Reziprozität im Wissenstransfer mit potenziellen Kooperationspartnern 
scheint aus Sicht von MNU profitabel zu sein, während restriktive Schutzstrategien schädlich 
sein könnten, da diese mangelhaftes Kooperationsinteresse signalisieren können.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass MNU sowohl legale als auch markt-basierte 
Wissensschutzstrategien entwickeln und einsetzen sollen. Beide Strategien sollten sich an der 
technologischen Landschaft des externen Standortes anhand zweier Dimensionen, 
geographisch und branchenbezogen, orientieren. Legaler Wissensschutz gewinnt an Relevanz, 
wenn der externe Standort den Status eines technologischen Führers aus geographischer Sicht 
besitzt. Damit verbundene Investitionen können auf der anderen Seite eingespart werden, 
wenn der geographische Standort technologisch unterentwickelt ist. Wissenstransfer mit den 
Wettbewerbern des externen Standortes erfordert jedoch Reziprozität hinsichtlich der markt-
basierten Strategien. Vor diesem Hintergrund sollte das Management von MNU in solchen 
Umfeldern aktiv an Kooperationsprojekten teilnehmen. Restriktive Schutzmechanismen sind 
die richtige Strategie für MNU-Niederlassungen, wenn das technologische Umfeld im 
Gastland unterentwickelt ist. 
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1 Introduction 
The development of new knowledge and technologies is globally concentrated in relatively 
few countries. Although a small number of countries, such as South Korea, have been very 
dynamic in their knowledge production in recent years (Furman and Hayes, 2004; Mahmood 
and Singh, 2003) still 80% of all R&D expenditures remain concentrated in the seven most 
industrialized countries (G7) in 2005 which is only slightly down from the 84% ten years 
earlier (Keller, 2004; OECD, 2007). Hence, international knowledge transfer becomes crucial 
for global growth (Romer, 1990). One of the most promising channels for facilitating these 
knowledge spillovers are Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and their network of 
international subsidiaries. Their advantages for border-spanning knowledge transfers have 
been conceptualized in several ways, such as the internalization of transaction costs (e.g. 
Buckley and Casson, 1981), differentiated networks that provide a fit with varying 
environmental and resource contingencies (e.g. Goshal and Bartlett, 1990) or social 
communities spanning borders (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
The effects of these engagements have been the subject of intense academic debate. Much 
research in international economics has focused on MNC’s potential to transfer knowledge to 
the host country (see for example Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Haskel et al., 2007; Keller, 
2002). In contrast, international business literature emphasizes the role of subsidiaries for 
accessing knowledge from host countries (see for example Almeida, 1996; Frost, 2001). 
However, only a relatively recent stream of literature focuses on the active knowledge 
protection strategies of MNCs to prevent their knowledge from spilling over host country 
competitors (Alcacer and Chung, 2007; Zhao, 2006). 
We extend this stream of research by investigating a broad spectrum of MNC knowledge 
protection strategies. These go beyond legal instruments, like patents which are used in most 
of the research studies as the only indicator of knowledge protection, and include market-
based instruments, like secrecy, lead time and complex design. Beyond investigating the 
importance of legal versus market-based knowledge protection strategies of MNCs, we argue 
that these strategies are not independent from the opportunities and challenges of the host 
country. We develop hypotheses for the moderating effect of host country contingencies on 
the choice and impact of knowledge protection strategies for MNCs. More precisely, by using 
R&D indices which indicate the technological leadership of a) MNC subsidiary’s industry and 
b) its host country location we tie up to findings of existing research and enrich it by 
suggesting that host country industry and location specific technological leadership play an 
important role in the choice of knowledge protection strategies.We test these hypotheses 
empirically for a broad sample of more than 1,500 firms in Germany. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework and the 
derivation of hypotheses based on this discussion. Section 3 presents the empirical study, 
which results are presented in section 4. We discuss them in section 5, draw conclusions and 
suggest some pathways for future research in section 6.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Literature review 
The goal of this section is to connect the literature on knowledge protection with the specific 
opportunities and challenges for MNC subsidiaries abroad. Knowledge spillovers to the host 
country from MNC subsidiaries (see for example Haskel et al., 2007; Keller, 2002) and vice 
versa (see for example Almeida, 1996; Frost, 2001) have received much attention in academic 
discussion. However, the particular topic of knowledge protection strategies by MNC 
subsidiaries has largely been neglected in international business literature so far (with the 
notable exceptions of Alcacer and Chung, 2007; Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Zhao, 2006).  
Several important studies on MNCs and international knowledge spillovers have treated 
patenting – the most prominent form of knowledge protection – as an indicator of knowledge 
production and related patent citations as traceable knowledge flows (e.g. Almeida and Phene, 
2004; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Porter and Stern, 2000). Most research examining 
international knowledge spillovers from MNCs (for a review see Keller, 2004) assign a rather 
passive role to MNC subsidiaries when it comes to managing or preventing outgoing 
knowledge spillovers. 
A growing stream of research emphasizes the role of knowledge protection for MNCs and 
their network of international subsidiaries. Several studies find that MNCs respond positively 
to stricter IPR enforcement in host countries (Branstetter et al., 2006; Ito and Wakasugi, 
2007). However, relatively little is known on how managers of MNC subsidiaries design their 
knowledge protection strategies. Alcacer and Chung (2007) show that MNC subsidiaries 
consider outgoing knowledge spillovers in their host county location choices. They 
demonstrate for international MNC entrants to the US market that firms expecting to benefit 
from ingoing knowledge spillovers locate close to US industry activity while those afraid of 
outgoing spillovers avoid them. Zhao (2006) shows for the case of China that MNCs choose 
to perform particular R&D activities in host countries with weak intellectual property rights 
(IPR) regimes which outputs are only valuable when combined with competitive assets 
protected in other countries with stronger IPR protection. Our goal is to extend this stream of 
research by going beyond location decisions and the complex organization of distributed 
R&D activities. We focus on the broader knowledge protection strategies of MNC subsidiary 
managers and relate them to host country contingencies. 
Knowledge protection is an important element of appropriating the returns from a firm’s 
investment in developing new products, processes or services (see for example Rivette and 
Kline, 2000). Unique knowledge is the most valuable resource of a firm as it enables them to 
develop, deploy and discard all other resources (Grant, 1996). However, knowledge is by its 
very nature a public good in the sense that it can easily spill over to competitors and enable 
them to imitate the innovative firm without investing into knowledge production (Adams and 
Jaffe, 1996; Nadiri, 1993). Firms have therefore strong incentives to protect their knowledge 
and prevent it from spilling over. Management may choose between legal knowledge 
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protection strategies (such as patenting) and market-based ones (such as secrecy) (Encaoua et 
al., 2006).1 
Legal forms of knowledge protection imply that knowledge is protected by intellectual 
property laws and infringements can be punished in court (Teece, 1998). Patenting is the most 
prominent element of this category granting exclusive usage rights to an invention for a 
certain period of time (Arrow, 1962). Other types of legal knowledge protection include the 
registration of industrial designs, trademarks and copyrights (Laursen and Salter, 2005). The 
latter do not grant rights for exclusive usage but a replication monopoly for its owner (Porter 
Liebeskind, 1997). Characteristic to legal knowledge protection methods is a formal 
application process for protection at a government agency (e.g. patent office). This process 
usually requires substantial investment in terms of time, resources and specialized expertise 
(e.g. consulting from lawyers). Legal protection is most applicable for established knowledge 
which can be codified and embodied in final products or services (Saviotti, 1998). Patenting 
has been found to be especially relevant for certain firms and industries. Firms with patents 
are typically larger, engage in R&D activities and operate in knowledge intensive sectors, 
especially pharmaceuticals, chemicals and machinery/equipment (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). The effectiveness of patenting for knowledge protection has 
been questioned as competitors may benefit from the knowledge disclosed in the patent itself 
which enables them to “invent around it”, i.e. circumvent central parts of the protection 
through alternative technological approaches (see for example Mansfield, 1986; Mansfield et 
al., 1981). Nevertheless, legal methods of knowledge protection allow managers to receive 
tangible representations of their investments into the production of intangible knowledge. 
Hence, the value of patents does not exclusively stem from protecting knowledge but also 
from signalling its value to investors or potential collaboration partners (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Harabi, 1995). 
Knowledge protection through market-based methods relies upon organizational processes 
aimed at preventing knowledge spillovers in the first place or limiting their negative effects. 
Existing research has primarily focussed on the following methods of market-based 
knowledge protection: secrecy, lead time, complex design as well as complementary assets in 
sales, marketing or production (Cohen et al., 2000; Harabi, 1995; Laursen and Salter, 2005). 
Secrecy requires restrictive sets of rules within the company limiting the transfer of 
knowledge to specified others, social interactions with them or restrict physical access to 
certain locations, e.g. laboratories (Porter Liebeskind, 1997). If these rules can be monitored 
and enforced effectively they provide efficient knowledge protection. This method has been 
found to be among the most important forms of knowledge protection for firms of all sizes 
and industries (Harabi, 1995). However, its effectiveness is also limited by personnel mobility 
as a channel for knowledge transfer to competitors (Arrow, 1962). Knowledge protection 
through lead time implies that firms can benefit from first mover advantages of being first to 
the market and exploiting the benefits before competitors can effectively challenge them 
through imitation (for a review see Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Complex design and 
                                                 
1  Other authors have suggested to call the market-based forms of knowledge protection (typically 
encompassing lead time, secrecy and complex design) as “strategic” or “first mover” and legal ones (primarily 
patenting, copyrights, industrial design trademarks) as “formal” (e.g. Harabi, 1995; Laursen and Salter, 2005). 
We stick with the terminology introduced by Encaoua et al. (2006). 
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complementarities with other firm functions adds additional barriers to successful knowledge 
spillovers to competitors. It implies that knowledge is only valuable when replicated in a 
certain context which may be easier to control and protect for a firm (Teece, 1998). Complex 
knowledge is more difficult to transfer completely as it requires the simultaneous transfer of 
additional knowledge to reach its full potential (Szulanski, 1996). Market-based protection 
methods can be used for all sorts of knowledge even in the early, tacit stages (Saviotti, 1998). 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
The choice of legal versus market-based knowledge protection strategies has often been 
explained by the necessary resource commitments which make market-based ones more 
appropriate for smaller firms (Byma and Leiponen, 2006). However, this seems to be a less 
pressing concern for MNCs. Instead, we argue that their choice of knowledge protection 
strategy depends upon the knowledge that has to be protected. Porter Liebeskind (1997) 
points out that this is an important dimension of knowledge protection. She differentiates 
between codified vs. tacit knowledge, individual vs. collective knowledge, legally protectable 
vs. non-protectable knowledge and usable vs. unusable knowledge. All of these factors 
influence the likelihood and channels for potential outflows of knowledge which have to be 
addressed through protection strategies. 
Market-based versus legal knowledge protection methods of MNC subsidiaries 
We argue that market-based protection strategies are especially relevant for MNC’s 
knowledge. Kogut and Zander (1993) envision an MNC as a social community with a shared 
understanding on the production and transfer of knowledge through repeated interaction. This 
capability enables MNCs to transfer knowledge effectively and efficiently between 
international subsidiaries. It is especially relevant for types of knowledge which are not 
codified or tacit in nature. These especially valuable pieces of knowledge can hardly be 
protected through legal protection methods. On the one hand, they require codification to be 
protected (Saviotti, 1998). The transferred knowledge is often just an “intermediate” good 
which will enter final products or services - which could be protected through legal methods - 
in later stages of the innovation process (Teece, 1998). On the other hand, legal protection 
methods like patenting would imply that MNC subsidiaries disclose some of this valuable 
knowledge by applying for legal protection, e.g. through patents (Gallini, 2002). In 
conclusion, we argue that the unique opportunity for MNCs to transfer tacit and not codified 
knowledge effectively to foreign subsidiaries requires an adequate protection strategy. 
Market-based knowledge protection strategies are especially suitable to protect this particular 
type of knowledge (Saviotti, 1998). We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Market-based knowledge protection methods are more 
important for MNC subsidiaries than legal ones for restricting 
outgoing knowledge spillovers. 
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The moderating role of host country opportunities and challenges in knowledge 
exchanges 
Additionally, we argue that MNC subsidiary management will choose the degree of 
restrictiveness of their knowledge protection strategies based on host country contingencies. 
We define the restrictiveness of a knowledge protection strategy through the variety and 
intensity of instruments used. A protection strategy encompassing multiple methods (e.g. 
secrecy and lead time) with high intensity would be considered more restrictive, i.e. allowing 
less outgoing knowledge spillovers. Our line of reasoning is built around the relationship 
between ingoing and outgoing knowledge spillovers. Both aspects are interconnected 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Access to promising knowledge sources in the host country 
may require a certain amount of knowledge sharing, i.e. less restrictive protection strategies. 
Hence, we argue that MNC subsidiary managers will choose knowledge protection strategies 
based on host country consistencies. 
On the one hand, more restrictive knowledge protection strategies appear appropriate in host 
counties where the likelihood of loosing valuable knowledge to competitors is high. The 
consequences of such spillovers depend crucially on the degree of the absorptive capacities of 
these host country competitors. Absorptive capacities encompass all competences and 
organizational processes for identifying, assimilating and exploiting knowledge from their 
environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). These absorptive capacities are typically 
acquired by performing own R&D activities and accumulating knowledge over time. Host 
countries with high R&D expenditures in a particular industry can therefore be expected to 
have domestic firms with high absorptive capacities. In such host countries MNC subsidiary 
management should opt for more restrictive knowledge protection strategies. In environments 
where this risk is low MNC subsidiary managers can opt for less restrictiveness and save 
scarce resources as all knowledge protection strategies entail certain costs, such as the legal 
advice for patent application or the monitoring of secrecy rules (Porter Liebeskind, 1997). We 
propose: 
Hypothesis 2a: MNC subsidiary managers opt for more restrictive 
knowledge protection strategies (legal and market-based) in 
technologically advanced host country environments. 
On the other hand, opportunities for knowledge spillovers from host country competitors 
have been identified as important incentives for MNCs to locate their subsidiaries in a 
particular country (Feinberg and Gupta, 2004) as well as within the host country (Alcacer and 
Chung, 2007; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). The latter authors find that MNCs locate their 
subsidiaries closer to industry activity in the host country if they expect to benefit from 
ingoing knowledge spillovers and farther away if they fear outgoing ones. Knowledge 
exchanges require stable channels and a mutual understanding over time (Laursen and Salter, 
2006). They benefit from repeated interaction and mutual trust (Hakanson and Nobel, 2001). 
Trust can be defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau et al., 
1998: p. 395). MNC subsidiary management engaging actively in knowledge sharing by 
accepting certain vulnerabilities through knowledge disclosure may compensate it with 
valuable ingoing spillovers in the future. Literature defines these positive expectations as 
 6
reciprocity mechanisms: “voluntarily repaying a trusting move at a later point in time, 
although defaulting on such repayment is in the short-term self interest of the reciprocator” 
(Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002, p. 50). We derive: 
Hypothesis 2b: MNC subsidiary managers opt for less restrictive 
knowledge protection strategies (legal and market-based) in 
technologically advanced host country environments. 
The relevant host country environment for in- and outgoing knowledge spillovers can be 
defined along industry as well as geographical dimensions. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) find 
that knowledge flows benefit from technological congruence between knowledge sources and 
recipients. Knowledge recipients find it easier to assess the relevance of the potential 
knowledge flow since it has been produced in a similar technological context. This shared 
context reduces the necessary costs for transforming the external knowledge before it can be 
absorbed and assimilated with existing knowledge stocks (Todorova and Durisin, 2007). 
Intra-industry spillovers can therefore be considered to be especially relevant for MNC 
subsidiaries. Hence, they may determine their choice of knowledge protection strategies. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The technological leadership status of the host country 
industry environment determines MNC subsidiary manager choices on 
knowledge protection strategies. 
Knowledge spillovers have been found to be confined to relatively narrow geographical 
areas (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). The effectiveness of knowledge transfers decreases 
significantly with the distance between source and recipient. This limitation has been 
explained through cultural, language and institutional differences across national borders but 
also within countries (Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 2005). Other authors have highlighted the 
limited mobility of skilled engineers and scientists (Almeida and Kogut, 1999). This 
perception considers personnel turnover as the primary channel for knowledge spillovers. The 
geographical concentration of knowledge spillovers can therefore be explained through the 
unwillingness of its carriers to move. We conclude: 
Hypothesis 4: The technological leadership status of host country 
geographical environment determines MNC subsidiary manager 
choices on knowledge protection strategies. 
3 Data and Methods 
Sample 
For testing our hypotheses we use data from the fourth European Community Innovation 
survey (CIS-4) for more than 1,800 firms and their innovation behaviour in Germany in 2005. 
The survey is directed at the heads of R&D departments or innovation management and 
comprises data on the innovation activities of firms from manufacturing as well as service 
sectors. Developed under the guiding principles of the Oslo Innovation Manual, the survey 
aims at collecting data on innovation understood from a broad firm perspective (OECD, 
 7
1992). Since most of the questions in the survey have to be answered only by innovative 
firms, i.e. firms that have introduced at least one product or process innovation between 2002 
and 2004 we restricted our sample to this group of firms. The sample is stratified by region 
(East and West Germany) in addition to size and industry to account for the effects of 
reunification. Roughly 10% of the firms in the sample are foreign subsidiaries.  
Heads of R&D departments or innovation management are asked directly if and how their 
firms are able to generate innovations. This leads to the production of direct measures for 
innovation processes and outputs which can complement traditional measures of innovation 
activity such as patents (Kaiser, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Moreover, CIS surveys are 
subject to extensive pre-testing and piloting in various countries, industries and firms with 
regard to interpretability, reliability and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This 
multinational application of CIS surveys adds extra layers of quality management and 
assurance. 
After complementing the dataset with official statistics for overall business R&D 
expenditure at the industry level from OECD ANBERD database, our final data set contains 
1,572 observations.  
Dependent variables 
We construct two scales representing market-based and legal knowledge protection which 
will serve as dependent variables. Both scales are constructed by combining various 
instruments used by firms to protect their knowledge following Laursen and Salter (2005). 
These instruments include patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial design, secrecy, lead 
time and complex design. In the questionnaire firms are asked to state the importance of each 
instrument in a four point Likert-based scale with 3 meaning “instrument is very important” 
and 0 “instrument is not relevant at all”. In order to group these instruments to the market-
based and legal knowledge protection scales respectively we apply an exploratory principal 
component analysis. We make use of a varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. The 
KMO-value with 0.76 indicates that the input variables are “meritoriously” suitable for a 
factor analysis (Kaiser and Rice, 1974: p.11). Two factors with eigenvalues greater than one 
are yielded which capture more than 60% of total variance (see Appendix A for details), each 
of which corresponding to one dimension of knowledge protection. The solution is robust as 
split-half-test yield similar solutions with two factors and comparable factor structure. The 
factor structure is meaningful and clear with no issues loading relatively high in both features 
(see Table 1 for the rotated factor loadings). Our results support theoretical findings of 
previous studies discussed in chapter 2 concerning the affiliation of knowledge protection 
instruments to both types of knowledge protection strategies. The pattern of factor loadings 
and their consistency indicate the high content validity of the yielded solution and can be 
considered as a consistency check of our data.  
Table 1: Factor loadings after varimax rotation 
Instruments Factor 1 Factor 2 
Patent  0.73 0.23 
Design pattern  0.79 0.10 
Trademark  0.67 0.15 
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Instruments Factor 1 Factor 2 
Copyright  0.52 0.16 
Secrecy 0.30 0.75 
Complex design  -0.08 0.80 
Lead time 0.25 0.80 
The first factor shows strong emphasis on secrecy, complex design and lead time and 
represents the importance of market-based knowledge protection strategies, whereas the 
second, has a focus on legal instruments, i.e. patents, design patterns, trademarks and 
copyrights, and is therefore labeled as legal knowledge protection. 
Factor scores of both factors, retained by means of regression analysis, are used as 
dependent variables for our further analysis.  
Independent variables 
The focal point of our analysis is the investigation of knowledge protection strategies of 
MNCs. A dummy variable which indicates whether the firm is part of a multinational group 
with headquarters abroad is the most important variable in our model. Managers indicate this 
status themselves in the questionnaire. The estimation parameter of this dummy variable 
incorporates the impact of MNC on knowledge protection. The sign and intensity of this 
estimator indicates how MNC subsidiary managers choose distinctively different market-
based and legal strategies due to the fact that they belong to an MNC.  
To define the reference group of purely domestic firms more precisely we add an additional 
variable indicating whether a firm is part of a group with domestic headquarters (“domestic 
group”). Purely domestic firms (not part of a group) will therefore serve as the comparison 
group. 
Most importantly, knowledge protection strategies may differ with regard to firms’ 
innovation and knowledge production engagements. We control for major innovation inputs 
by using R&D expenditures as a share of sales, the share of employees with college education 
and whether the firm performs R&D activities continuously (often associated with having a 
dedicated R&D department). 
Several studies highlight the importance of subsidiary assignments from headquarters for 
explaining their behavior (e.g. Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; 
Hakanson and Nobel, 2001). Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) provide an in-depth discussion of 
subsidiary mandates, relating them back to March (1991) and the distinction between 
explorative (directed towards new product, capabilities and markets) and exploitative 
innovation activities (built around and for existing capabilities and customers). We construct 
two indices for explorative and exploitative innovation strategies based on a question of the 
effects of a firm’s innovation activities. Again, firms rank several items on a four point Likert 
scale ranging from not relevant to highly important. We add up relevant items and divide 
them by the maximum. Firms’ innovation strategies are considered explorative based on the 
importance of generating new products and serving new markets. Innovation strategies are 
considered exploitative if quality improvements, resources and personnel cost reductions are 
dominant. Moreover, we control for how long a firm has been operating in Germany 
(company age as years since founding) because potential “liability of newness”-effects may 
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also influence subsidiary host country embeddedness and subsequent behavior (e.g. Hakanson 
and Nobel, 2001). 
Previous studies have identified several structural firm features which influence the choice 
of certain knowledge protection strategies especially with an eye on the propensity to patent. 
These include resource availability (firm size), type of innovation activity (product/process) 
and industry (e.g. Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Byma and 
Leiponen, 2006; Harabi, 1995). Hence, we incorporate these control variables into the model: 
Firm size (number of employees in logs), whether the firm was active in process innovation as 
well as five industry dummies (medium high-tech manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing, 
distributive services, knowledge-intensive services and technological services). Low-tech 
manufacturing will serve as the comparison group (see Appendix C for industry 
classification). We also control for a firms’ degree of internationalization through the export 
share of their sales.  
Moderator variables 
The host country environment is described along two dimensions: (a) the industry in which 
the MNC subsidiary operates and (b) its geographical location. In order to represent the 
degree of technological leadership of industry and geographical environment of host country 
we construct three R&D-indices following Salomon and Byungchae (2008). 
We use the OECD ANBERD database on business R&D expenditures to construct the R&D 
index. Data covers the year 2002 (the beginning of the survey observation period) so that it 
can be considered predetermined. The R&D-industry index is built by comparing the R&D 
expenditures (as a share of industry GDP) of the relevant industry in Germany with the 
average one of all other OECD countries. First, the R&D expenditure in industry i is scaled by 
GDP of host country (Germany). Next, the resulting ratio is averaged across all countries in 
OECD besides Germany. In a last step the mean is subtracted from the equivalent measure for 
Germany in the matching industry i (see also Salomon and Byungchae, 2008). The result is an 
industry specific R&D index comparing industries in Germany with those in the rest of 
OECD on the basis of R&D expenditures. Positive values of the index indicate relative 
technological leadership of host country (Germany) in a particular industry, whereas negative 
values indicate that the host country is a technological laggard in a given industry.  
GE kn
i i
i GE k
k 1
R&D R&D 1RDI x
GDP GDP n=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ,  
 
where iRDI  represents the R&D-index of industry i, 
GE
iR&D  is the R&D expenditure for 
industry i in Germany, GEGDP  the GDP of Germany, kiR&D  is the R&D expenditure for 
industry i in country k, kGDP  is the GDP of country k and n the number of OECD countries 
excluding Germany.  
Similarly we construct two geographical R&D indices used for indicating relative 
technological leadership of an MNC subsidiary geographical location in reference to the rest 
of host country (Germany). We obtain regional data on business R&D expenditures and GDP 
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for 2001 from the German federal statistical office (Destatis) and from the European statistical 
office (Eurostat). Geographical location is defined broadly in the first index (federal state in 
Germany) and more narrowly in the second (district where the firm is positioned). Germany 
comprises 16 federal states which are subdivided into 439 districts (NUTS3). We calculate 
two separate geographical R&D indices using both geographical units. Both indices are 
calculated as follows: 
kn
d
d d k
k 1
R&D R&D 1RDI x
GDP GDP n=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ,  
 
whereas the index d represents the state or district depending on geographical unit used, 
with RDId representing the R&D index of state or district d, dGDP  the GDP of respective 
state of district d, kR  the R&D expenditure in state or district k, kGDP  the GDP of state or 
district k. N represents the number of states or districts excluding the actual one (d). Hence, in 
case of using states as a geographical unit, n can take values from 1 to 15, whereas when 
using districts the value range for n goes from 1 to 438. Figure 2 provides a map of the results. 
Figure 1: Share of business R&D expenditures on GDP at state and district level 2001 
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Legend
Business R&D intensity
0,0 - 0,50,6 - 1,01,1 - 2,52,6 - 5,0,1 - 10,010,1 - 15,0  
Source: Own calculation and illustration based on OECD, Destatis and Eurostat data. 
We test both geographical indices in our model in order to investigate which geographical 
unit has the highest impact on knowledge protection strategies for MNC companies. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the knowledge protection instruments for the whole 
sample as well as separately for foreign MNCs and subsidiaries and domestic firms. Heads of 
R&D or innovation management indicate the importance of various instruments for their 
firms in four-point Likert-based scale. We calculate the means and standard deviations of 
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these data. The results reveal clear differences between foreign MNC subsidiaries and 
domestic firms. Foreign MNC subsidiaries seem to use a wider variety of protection 
instruments more extensively. For testing the significance of differences between MNC 
subsidiaries and domestic firms we use the Smith-Sautterthwaite test which is especially 
appropriate for different sized and small samples (see Appendix D for test details). 
The t-values as well as the error probabilities are displayed in Table 2. The statistical results 
indicate first empirical evidence for our hypotheses: significant differences are identified in 
the relevance of six out of the eight considered knowledge protection instruments. The 
significant differences contain however legal as well as market-based instruments so that it 
cannot be clearly recognized which kind of knowledge protection (market based vs. legal) is 
more relevant for foreign MNC subsidiaries as compared to domestic firms. The results of the 
market-based instruments do not give a uniform picture: whereas secrecy becomes 
significantly more important for foreign MNC subsidiaries, differences concerning complex 
designs and lead time are not statistically significant.  
Table 2: Relevance of knowledge protection instruments for MNC and domestic firms 
Knowledge Protection  
Instrument 
  
Sample 
N=1,572 
MNC 
N=166 
DOM. 
N=1,472
t-Value 
(paired 
t-Test) 
 α 
Patent  Mean 0.85 1.53 0.77 7.23 * 0%
  Std. Dev. 1.27 1.41 1.23       
Design pattern  Mean 0.58 0.84 0.54 3.33 * 0%
  Std. Dev. 1.08 1.24 1.06       
Trademark  Mean 0.60 0.73 0.59 1.53 *** 6%
  Std. Dev. 1.11 1.19 1.10       
Copyright  Mean 0.22 0.31 0.21 1.65 * 5%
LE
G
A
L 
  Std. Dev. 0.74 0.89 0.72       
Secrecy Mean 1.20 1.58 1.15 3.72 * 0%
  Std. Dev. 1.37 1.41 1.36       
Complex design  Mean 0.53 0.46 0.53 -0.87   19%
  Std. Dev. 1.06 1.04 1.07       
Lead time Mean 1.30 1.41 1.28 1.08   14%
M
A
R
K
ET
 
B
A
SE
D
 
  Std. Dev. 1.42 1.45 1.42       
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
In a further step we divide the foreign MNC subsidiary group into subsets according to the 
host country environment and consider descriptive statistics of all groups in order to 
investigate further differences. Respectively two subsets are yielded for both R&D indices a) 
foreign MNC subsidiaries operating in technologically leading host country industries versus 
technological laggards and b) foreign MNC subsidiaries located at technologically advanced 
geographical areas versus technologically lagging ones. The respective median values of 
R&D indices are used as cutoff values. We use the R&D-index based on federal states as 
geographical unit when considering technological advantage of geographical environment.  
Again we aim to detect significant differences between the means in the respective groups 
by using the Smith-Sautterthwaite test. Our expectations are confirmed: significant 
differences are detected depending on the technological leadership of the host environment of 
the foreign MNC subsidiary along both dimensions. While using the industry as a dimension 
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for technological leadership we discover that foreign MNC subsidiaries choose generally 
more restrictive knowledge protection strategies when operating in industries where the host 
country, in our case Germany, is a technological laggard compared to OECD average. In this 
case protection strategies become more relevant compared to technologically advanced 
industries This is expressed in the significantly higher relevance of protection instruments. 
Especially patents and secrecy seem to gain in importance for protecting knowledge when the 
host country is a technological laggard concerning the operating industry of foreign MNC 
subsidiaries. Even in this case differences occur in both market-based as well as in the legal 
group, so that no clear differentiation pattern can be discovered.  
Technological advantage of geographical location seems to influence the intensity of 
knowledge protection for foreign MNC subsidiaries in the opposite direction. When located in 
technologically advanced areas (federal states) foreign MNC subsidiaries seem to protect 
knowledge more restrictively. Although this finding seems to be against our expectations, it 
can be explained considering the higher risk of knowledge spill-outs in highly developed 
geographical areas due to personnel turnover. Loosing highly qualified employees and thus 
valuable knowledge to competitors becomes more likely in these regions. Hence, knowledge 
protection management tempting to prevent or regulate the transfer of knowledge becomes 
more important. 
Table 3: Knowledge protection instruments for MNC in different environments 
Knowledge Protection Instruments Industry Location 
 MNC 
RDI>0 
N=105 
MNC 
RDI<0
N=61 
t-
Value 
  α MNC 
RDI>0 
N=79 
MNC 
RDI<0 
N=87 
t-
Value 
  α 
Patent  Mean 0.18 1.00 -3.72 * 0% 1.70 1.34 1.65 ** 5%
  Std. Dev. 1.35 1.37       1.41 1.40       
Design pattern  Mean 
0.93 0.69 1.27
**
* 10% 1.18 0.47 3.91 * 0%
  Std. Dev. 1.29 1.15       1.31 1.05       
Trademark  Mean 0.81 0.59 1.21   11% 0.89 0.56 1.80 ** 4%
  Std. Dev. 1.26 1.04       1.24 1.11       
Copyright  Mean 0.36 0.23 1.00   16% 0.51 0.10 3.10 * 0%
LE
G
A
L 
  Std. Dev. 0.97 0.72       1.09 0.52       
Secrecy Mean 1.83 1.15 3.08 * 0% 1.75 1.39 1.63 ** 5%
  Std. Dev. 1.37 1.38       1.39 1.41       
Complex design  Mean 0.51 0.36 0.97   17% 0.52 0.39 0.78   22%
  Std. Dev. 1.11 0.90       1.08 0.99       
Lead time Mean 
1.52 1.21 1.34
**
* 9% 1.62 1.18 1.99 ** 2%
M
A
R
K
ET
-
B
A
SE
D
 
  Std. Dev. 1.45 1.44       1.44 1.43       
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Appendix B provides correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics for all variables in 
our study. Dependent variables are standardized in order to control for scaling effects. 
Exceptions are the natural logarithm of the number of employees as well as the R&D indices 
for both industry and location. An inspection of the correlation matrix does not reveal any 
multicollinearity issues, showing a mean inflation factor (VIF) of 1.40. 
 13
4 Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis. We estimate four separate empirical 
models for the legal and market-based knowledge protection scales respectively. Model I can 
be considered a base model without interaction terms. We find that foreign MNC subsidiary 
managers choose significantly less restrictive market-based knowledge protection strategies 
than domestic firms but do not deviate with regards to the restrictiveness of legal knowledge 
protection. Hence, hypothesis 1 has to be rejected. As suggested in the theoretical section we 
explore further contingencies on these choices by adding interaction terms. In model II we 
interact the foreign MNC status with the R&D index of the host country industry. The latter 
reflects whether a German industry is leading or lagging in R&D intensity compared to all 
other OECD countries. Besides, we add an equivalent interaction effect for the leadership 
status of the German state a company is located in, compared to all other 15 states. The 
estimation results reveal an interesting distinction compared to the base model I. With regard 
to legal knowledge protection strategies we find that the geographical area is the decisive 
contingency for MNC subsidiary managers. They choose more restrictive legal strategies in 
technologically leading host country states. The leadership status of the industry, though, has 
no significant impact. This result provides support for hypotheses 2a and 4. However, we find 
strikingly different results for market-based knowledge protection strategies (Model IIb). 
MNC subsidiary managers choose less restrictive market-based strategies in technologically 
leading host country industries while the status of the state (geographical area) has no such 
effect. Therefore, the finding of the base model on less restrictive market-based knowledge 
protection strategies is confined to technologically leading host country industries. These 
results lend support to hypotheses 2b and 3. 
We define the relevant geographical environment of an foreign MNC subsidiary more 
narrowly at the district level (NUTS3) in model III and retain the same results. However, the 
significance level of the more restrictive legal protection strategies drops indicating that the 
state-level appears to be more appropriate. Finally, we add another interaction term in model 
IV accounting for simultaneous industry and geographically leadership status effect. This 
estimation yields no additional insights and can be considered as a consistency check. 
In summary, we find a differentiated picture for foreign MNC subsidiary management 
choices on the restrictiveness of their knowledge protection strategies. They choose more 
restrictive legal protection strategies within geographical regions of host country leadership 
and less restrictive market-based ones within technologically leading industries. We will 
return to this distinction when discussing these results in the following section. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
Model Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb 
Variable Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Legal knowl. 
prot. (scale) 
Market-
based knowl. 
prot. (scale) 
Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Foreign MNC (d)  0.05 -0.18** -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Domestic MNC (d) 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Interact: RDI * foreign    0.04 -0.20*** 0.04 -0.20*** -0.01 -0.16** 
   (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Interact: RDI * domestic   -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Inteact: StateIndex * foreign    0.33*** 0.04     
   (0.09) (0.07)     
Inteact: StateIndex * domestic   0.06** 0.06**     
   (0.02) (0.03)     
Interact: DistrictIndex * foreign      0.07* 0.02 0.06 0.03 
     (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Interact: DistrictIndex * domestic     -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Interact: RDI * DistrictIndex * foreign        0.03 -0.02 
       (0.03) (0.02) 
Interact: RDI * DistrictIndex * domestic       -0.04 0.00 
       (0.03) (0.03) 
Company age (years)  0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share R&D exp. of sales (ratio)  1.05*** 0.64* 1.05*** 0.69* 1.05*** 0.66* 1.04*** 0.67* 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) 
Contin. R&D activities (d) 0.23*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Share empl. w/ college educ. (ratio) 0.07 0.44*** 0.08 0.47*** 0.07 0.44*** 0.07 0.45*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) 
Explorative innovation strategy (index)  0.28*** 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Exploitative innovation strategy (index) 0.08 0.28*** 0.06 0.29*** 0.07 0.29*** 0.06 0.29*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
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Model Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb 
Variable Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Legal knowl. 
prot. (scale) 
Market-
based knowl. 
prot. (scale) 
Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Legal 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Market-based 
knowl. prot. 
(scale) 
Share exports of sales (ratio) 0.51*** 0.28** 0.50*** 0.24** 0.51*** 0.26** 0.51*** 0.26** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
No of employees (log)  0.16*** 0.03* 0.16*** 0.03* 0.16*** 0.03* 0.16*** 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Process innovation (d) -0.13*** 0.12** -0.13*** 0.12** -0.13** 0.12** -0.13** 0.11** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medium high-tech manuf. (d)  0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
High-tech manuf. (d) 0.02 0.34*** 0.01 0.34*** 0.02 0.34*** 0.03 0.33*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Distributive services (d)  -0.32*** -0.17** -0.30*** -0.16** -0.31*** -0.17** -0.31*** -0.17** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Knowledge-intens. services (d) -0.27*** -0.03 -0.28*** -0.02 -0.28*** -0.02 -0.28*** -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Technological services (d) -0.18** 0.01 -0.19** 0.03 -0.20** 0.02 -0.20*** 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
RDI (index)  0.00 -0.02       
 (0.04) (0.04)       
District business R&D index (NUTS3)  0.01 0.01       
 (0.01) (0.01)       
Constant -1.07*** -0.99*** -1.05*** -1.02*** -1.05*** -1.00*** -1.05*** -1.00*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
R2 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.21 
N  1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
F-value  28.25 26.86 26.51 25.20 25.69 24.32 23.44 22.29 
P-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% or 10%; robust standard errors.
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We develop no a priori hypotheses for the control variables. However, major results should 
be highlighted briefly. Our findings indicate that all knowledge production activities (R&D) 
lead to more restrictive knowledge protection strategies (both legal and market-based). The 
share of college educated employees, though, has only a positive effect on market-based 
protection methods. This need for protecting valuable knowledge is also reflected in the more 
exploitative innovation strategies (directed at new products and new markets). Exploitative 
innovation strategies and process innovation, though, are more likely protected through 
market-based protection methods. Other studies have found similar results and concluded that 
the embeddedness of process innovation within a larger production system facilitates market-
based protection methods (Byma and Leiponen, 2006; Harabi, 1995). Managers choose also 
more restrictive protection strategies (both legal and market-based) with increasing firm size 
and internationalization which may reflect the availability of resources to do so. Finally, we 
support existing literature on the industry specificity of knowledge protection (e.g. Arundel 
and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). Legal protection strategies are generally 
less frequently used in service industries. Market-based knowledge protection is more 
important in high-tech manufacturing and less important in distributive services. 
5 Discussion 
We conduct this study to extend existing research emphasizing the important role of active 
knowledge protection strategies of MNC subsidiaries beyond location choices (Alcacer and 
Chung, 2007; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). We hypothesize that MNC subsidiary managers have 
strong incentives to protect the valuable MNC knowledge as long as it does not negatively 
interfere with opportunities for sourcing knowledge from the host country environment. We 
describe this environment along two major dimensions: the technological leadership status of 
the host country industry and the host country geographical area respectively. 
Our empirical investigation among more than 1,500 firms in Germany reveals that both 
dimensions provide important contingencies to MNC subsidiary managers. However, they 
differ with regard to the type of knowledge protection. Legal forms of knowledge protection 
(e.g. patenting) are used more restrictively if the host country geographical environment is 
technologically leading. We suspect that this is due to the fact that the dangers for knowledge 
outflows through personnel turnover are especially pressing in these areas as skilled 
employees would have multiple opportunities to find adequate, new jobs without major 
distractions to their personal life. These particular spillovers through personnel mobility 
would render knowledge protection through market-based methods such as secrecy 
meaningless (see for example Arrow, 1962). 
The choice of market-based knowledge protection strategies by MNC subsidiary managers 
is substantially different. They choose less restrictive ones in technologically leading host 
country industries. We conclude that demonstrated reciprocity in knowledge exchanges is 
especially rewarding with technologically leading host country counterparts. Overly 
restrictive market-based protection strategies, such as secrecy, may severely damage these 
relationships as they are designed to provide no signals to potential counterparts. In other 
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words, host country counterparts would find it especially difficult to judge the potential for 
knowledge exchanges if the MNC keeps all its knowledge secrete. This mechanism is 
different from legal protection strategies which imply a formal application process which 
includes the mandatory disclosure of knowledge in exchange for legal protection (Gallini and 
Scotchmer, 2002). This provides firms with tangible signals of their research activities for 
potential partners (Harabi, 1995). 
Management recommendations can be derived based on our results. From a management 
perspective, MNCs need to develop knowledge protection strategies that go beyond patenting. 
Previous studies have mostly focused on MNC subsidiary patenting activity and location 
choices (e.g. Alcacer and Chung, 2007; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). However, this may only 
represent a subset of potential strategic choices for MNC subsidiary management. It may for 
example not be a feasible option when the subsidiary has been acquired and opportunities for 
relocating R&D activities are limited. We find that both legal and market-based knowledge 
protection strategies should be considered. Both have to reflect host country contingencies 
along two major dimensions: industry and geography. MNC subsidiaries require formal 
knowledge protection capabilities such as the specialized patent law competencies when they 
engage in geographically leading host country regions. Conversely, the budgets for 
developing and maintaining these capabilities can be limited in host country states or districts 
with lagging status. Most interestingly, we find that technological opportunities for sourcing 
knowledge from host country competitors in the same industry require reciprocity with 
regards to market-based protection strategies (such as secrecy). MNC subsidiary management 
should be prepared to actively engage in host country knowledge sharing once opportunities 
arise. In lagging host country industry environments, though, they should increase the 
restrictiveness these protection mechanisms. 
Limitations and further research 
First, we benefit from a comprehensive database. However, our empirical study is limited to 
the German context. Internationally comparative studies may provide additional insights. 
Further avenues for further research are possible changes or discontinuities in the host country 
environment. Such discontinuities, e.g. changes in technology or in the competitive landscape, 
may influence a firm’s choice on knowledge protection strategies. Furthermore, heterogeneity 
in firm profiles or their capabilities of anticipating changes in host country contingencies 
could be taken into account in future work.  
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Appendix A: Results of principal component factor analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 2.79 1.58 0.40 0.40 
Factor2 1.20 0.33 0.17 0.57 
Factor3 0.87 0.19 0.12 0.69 
Factor4 0.68 0.09 0.10 0.79 
Factor5 0.60 0.13 0.09 0.88 
Factor6 0.47 0.08 0.07 0.94 
Factor7 0.39 - 0.06 1.00 
Cronbach alpha scale reliability coefficient: 0.75 
LR test independent vs. saturated chi2(21)=2389.60, Prob>chi2=0.0 
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Appendix B: Correlations and descriptive statistics 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Foreign MNC (d)  1.00                                 
2. Domestic MNC (d) -0.13 1.00                               
3. Share R&D exp. of sales (ratio)  -0.03 -0.02 1.00                             
4. Contin. R&D activities (d) 0.14 0.19 0.32 1.00                           
5. Share empl. w/ college educ. (ratio) -0.02 0.01 0.39 0.18 1.00                         
6. Explorative innovation strategy (index)  0.03 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.11 1.00                       
7. Exploitative innovation strategy (index) 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.16 -0.10 0.36 1.00                     
8. Share exports of sales (ratio) 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.36 0.02 0.17 0.14 1.00                   
9. No of employees (log)  0.27 0.34 -0.19 0.23 -0.26 0.05 0.20 0.29 1.00                 
10. Process innovator 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 0.19 -0.04 0.13 1.00               
11. Medium high-tech manuf. (d)  0.09 0.08 0.06 0.22 -0.01 0.10 0.08 0.35 0.12 -0.08 1.00             
12. High-tech manuf. (d) 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.18 1.00           
13. Distributive services (d)  -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.11 1.00         
14. Knowledge-intens. services (d) -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.23 0.03 0.04 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 1.00       
15. Technological services (d) -0.09 -0.06 0.25 0.04 0.53 -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 -0.27 -0.07 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 1.00     
16. Strength of state in business R&D intensity (index) 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.12 1.00   
17. Strength of German industry R&D intens. by OECD 2003 (index) 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.08 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.14 -0.02 0.56 0.03 -0.08 -0.17 -0.27 0.00 1.00 
  
Mean 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.43 0.21 0.65 0.49 0.21 4.30 0.67 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.31 0.18 
Standard deviation 0.31 0.33 0.08 0.49 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.26 1.56 0.47 0.40 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.34 1.98 0.67 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.22 -0.92 
Max 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 8.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 3.98 
VIF 1.21 1.28 1.39 1.50 1.71 1.29 1.29 1.47 1.60 1.11 1.80 1.31 1.14 1.22 1.86 1.04 1.57 
Mean VIF 1.40 
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Appendix C: Industry breakdown 
Industry NACE Code Industry Group 
Mining and quarrying 10 – 14 Other manufacturing 
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Other manufacturing 
Textiles  and leather 17 – 19 Other manufacturing 
Wood / paper / publishing 20 – 22 Other manufacturing 
Chemicals / petroleum  23 – 24 Medium high-tech 
manufacturing 
Plastic / rubber  25 Other manufacturing 
Glass / ceramics  26 Other manufacturing 
Metal  27 – 28 Other manufacturing 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment 
29 Medium high-tech 
manufacturing 
Manufacture of electrical machinery 30 – 32 High-tech manufacturing 
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 
33 High-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 – 35 Medium high-tech 
manufacturing 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, 
sports equipment and toys 
36 – 37 Other manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40 – 41 Other manufacturing 
Construction 45 Other manufacturing 
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Distributive services 
Wholesale trade 51 Distributive services 
Transportation and communication 60 – 63, 64.1 Distributive services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Knowledge-intensive 
services 
Real estate activities and renting 70 – 71 Distributive services 
ICT services 72, 64.2 Technological services 
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Technological services 
Consulting 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive 
services 
Other business-oriented services 74.5 – 74.8, 90 Distributive services 
Appendix D: Smith-Satherwaite Test  
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where: 1x = mean of sample (group) 1 
2x = mean of sample (group)  2 
1s = standard deviation of sample 1 
2s = standard deviation of sample 2 
1n = size of sample 1 
2n = size of sample 2. 
The degrees of freedom are rounded off to the next highest whole number. 
 
